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Abstract:  
The scientific investigation of music requires contributions from a diverse array of 
disciplines (e.g. anthropology, musicology, neuroscience, psychology, music theory, 
music therapy, sociology, computer science, evolutionary biology, archaeology, 
acoustics and philosophy). Given the diverse methodologies, interests and research 
targets of the disciplines involved, we argue that there is a plurality of legitimate 
research questions about music, necessitating a focus on integration. In light of this we 
recommend a pluralistic conception of music—that there is no unitary definition 
divorced from some discipline, research question or context. This has important 
implications for how the scientific study of music ought to proceed: we show that some 
definitions are complementary, that is, they reflect different research interests and 
ought to be retained and, where possible, integrated, while others are antagonistic, they 
represent real empirical disagreement about music’s nature and how to account for it. 
We illustrate this in discussion of two related issues: questions about the evolutionary 
function (if any) of music, and questions of the innateness (or otherwise) of music. 
These debates have been, in light of pluralism, misconceived. We suggest that, in both 
cases, scientists ought to proceed by constructing integrated models which take into 
account the dynamic interaction between different aspects of music. 
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1. Introduction  
Music is a complex and fascinating target of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, 
theorists disagree on what music is—on how best to characterise or define it (see e.g. 
Davies, 2012a; McKeown-Green, 2014). We argue that although some of this 
disagreement should be retained, some should be resolved. That is, contra several 
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attempts to provide a unitary definition of music (e.g. Kania, 2011; Levinson, 1990; 
Godt, 2005), we advocate a form of conceptual pluralism—that is, there is no objective, 
definitive definition of music independent of some explanatory context; rather, there 
are multiple, non-equivalent, legitimate concepts of music. Our argument is based on an 
examination of musical science itself: it is plausible, given the range of questions and 
evidence which scientific investigation of music requires, that there is no unitary 
definition of music simpliciter.  
Moreover, we argue that musical pluralism has positive consequences: it can lead 
and drive integration in the study of music. To this end, we distinguish complementary 
and antagonistic relationships between definitions. Complementary definitions target 
different aspects of music, or music in different contexts, while antagonistic definitions 
give rise to empirical disagreements. Embracing a plurality of concepts does not entail 
accepting every one. Indeed, definitions and empirical work are not independent. Given 
a particular research question, some definitions can be more or less appropriate, and 
determining the best one for the job can itself be an empirical task. In other words, good 
definitions are not necessarily stipulated assumptions: they can be legitimate research 
findings. Indeed, to render some aspect of a real-world phenomenon amenable to 
scientific investigation, scientists often need to approach definitions somewhat 
instrumentally: operational definitions are called for.1 The relationship between 
                                                          
1  An anonymous referee points out that such operational, instrumental definitions often require a 
stipulated, general account of ‘music’ to get off the ground, otherwise the relationship between some of the 
concepts we discuss, for instance the distinction between ‘music’ and ‘musicality’, is decidedly ambiguous. This 
might be right, the relationship between the various concepts required to make music scientifically tractable 
can be very complex. We take this to be grist for our mill: on our view, different research agendas require a 
number of different, but importantly related concepts. Considering how these concepts interact is an 
important part of integrating such perspectives. 
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evaluative and instrumental definitions is complex, and we think the framework we 
present in §2 gives some guidance for navigating this.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section we provide a rough and partial sketch 
of the complexity of musical investigation. In §3 we draw on this to argue for pluralism. 
In the remainder of the paper, we illustrate our point and tie discussion to scientific 
practice. In §4 we discuss the relationship between music and evolution and in §5 we 
turn to music’s innateness (or otherwise). 
2.  The Science of Music: A Sketch 
This section sketches the science of music along two lines. We discuss the 
research agendas which guide inquiry (§2.1) and the lines of evidence (§2.2) which are 
drawn upon. This picture forms the basis of our argument for pluralism in §3. It is 
important to note that the view we present here is both schematic and heuristic. 
Particularly in terms of research agendas, our account is inadequate as an attempt to 
capture the actual landscape of music research. However, in regards to our argument 
about musical pluralism, this is a feature rather than a bug. Our aim is to show how 
complex and multi-faceted musical research is, and this is used to motivate pluralism in 
§3. That the sketch fails to capture all of this complexity (in ways we shall point out) 
strengthens our argument. 
2.1  Research Agendas 
Different aspects of music must be approached from a variety of stances: there is 
no one question about music, but a plurality. Following Love and Brigandt (see below) 
we call these stances ‘research agendas’. Of course, a plurality of agendas does not entail 
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a plurality of music concepts, but as we shall see, the complexity of musical research at 
least makes pluralism attractive.  
We take a ‘research agenda’ to be a perspective from which one might approach 
the study of music. These perspectives will include a set of investigative concerns. For 
instance, the scientist interested in psychological models of music will be largely 
interested in how adult humans process musical information, and the psychological 
features which underlie musical behaviour. In contrast, the scientist interested in 
psychological musical development will focus on how these features develop over 
ontogeny; the changes taking place as children develop. The agendas come apart in 
terms of the kinds of questions they ask, and the kinds of answers that they want.  
There is an issue regarding the commensurability or otherwise of various 
research agendas. How, indeed, might evolutionary and aesthetic approaches be 
meshed? For the purposes of this paper, we will put this to one side. Below we give an 
account of how integration between agendas may occur, but take it that whether some 
are ultimately incommensurable is a question which can only be answered by doing the 
science, that is, whether and how specific approaches might be integrated (or not) will 
be decided by the outcome of research, not a priori. 
We characterize the complexity of musical research in a rough and ready way, 
along two dimensions: level of organization and temporal scale. Fig. 1 loosely sketches 
this landscape:  
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Fig. 1: Research areas along dimensions of abstraction and temporal scale 
 
Fig. 1 is heuristic: it is not an authoritative analysis of the layout of music 
scholarship.  Indeed, there will be many other useful ways of characterising the 
research space too; we illustrate our conception’s utility below. Even so, some caveats 
are important before we explain the dimensions. Firstly, some domains are probably 
misplaced: if, as we argue, the biological and cultural aspects of music evolved 
dynamically, then it might be a mistake to separate the evolution of musical psychology 
and music’s cultural evolution. We return to this thought in §4. Secondly, for reasons of 
parsimony, the figure does not clearly distinguish the object of some investigation (for 
instance, music’s evolution) from the method by which some investigation proceeds (for 
instance, neuroscientific versus psychological). To be sure, we do not endorse conflating 
objects and methods, as will be clear from our discussion. A more thorough attempt to 
characterise the voluminous landscape of musical science, beyond the scope of this 
paper, will by necessity incorporate more dimensions. 
Temporal Scale 
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Research questions about music can be organised along a temporal scale: some 
questions are long-range, concerning glacially paced processes in the deep past, while 
others cover shorter, quicker time-frames.2  
Ernst Mayr (1961) famously distinguished between ultimate and proximate 
causes of biological phenomena. Although we do not commit to the distinction (indeed, 
it is highly problematic, see Ariew, 2003; Beatty, 1994; Calcott, 2013; Laland et al., 
2013), it is a useful way of illustrating our point. An ‘ultimate cause’ explains traits in 
terms of evolutionary history. We might ask, for instance, whether music is an 
adaptation, whether musical traits were positively selected for in our evolutionary 
history. Proximate causes, in contrast, shape an organism over its lifetime—we might 
wonder from what age a child is able to recognise and remember melodies, for instance. 
A proximate explanation of birdsong might be that increased light in spring precipitates 
the release of a hormone in a male songbird’s brain (e.g., Moore et al., 2006). The 
ultimate, evolutionary explanation might be that birdsong indexes the quality of the 
male bird against its conspecifics, in an effort to attract females with which to breed.  
In other words, our temporal scale resembles the phylogeny/ontogeny 
continuum (Gould 1977). However, the temporal scale is not restricted to questions of 
evolution and development.  As we move from left to right on the temporal axis we shift 
from research agendas covering the origin of music, its evolution and subsequent 
historical development, to questions about how musical cognition develops over a 
lifetime, to theoretical questions about musical structure. At its extreme right end, 
questions become near-atemporal. Western-style analytic music theory (analysis of 
music in the Western terms of meter, scales, and so on), for instance, is hardly 
                                                          
2  Note that our use of the term ‘scale’ is not meant to imply literal measurement. 
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temporally bound.3 Much of modern cognitive science and psychology is concerned with 
characterising contemporary human minds, not explaining them in terms of historical 
forces (for example, see Eerola, 2012 for a computational model of musical emotion 
perception; Lerud et al., 2014 for a neurodynamic model of auditory response to 
musical intervals; Neuhaus, 2013 for approaches to musical form processing; Tesoriero 
and Rickard, 2012 for frameworks for elucidating music-facilitated recall). 
How a researcher approaches the study of music, then—that is, the nature of 
their research agenda—depends in part on temporal scale. Some might target relatively 
narrow scales, such as the emergence of musical capacities during ontogeny, or 
anthropological studies of musical expression across human cultures. Others target 
wider scales like the historian tracing the development of musical styles across 
centuries, or wider yet, the question of when and why musical capacities appeared in 
our evolutionary history. 
Levels of Organization 
Our other dimension organises research agendas by the ‘level of organization’ 
they target. This is a common notion which is nonetheless difficult to specify, 
philosophically speaking. We can understand a ‘level of organization’ in terms of either 
the ontological relationships between targets of investigation, or in terms of how 
                                                          
3  Musical features associated with Western music-theoretic concepts, however, are arranged 
temporally—meter, tonality and so on have specific meanings relative to different eras in music history. A 
chronology of Western music-theoretic concepts might fall under the broad study of History of music on Fig. 1. 
Of course, Western music theory is not the only music theory! One of the great weaknesses of much musical 
research is that it assumes that a Western musical experience is universal (or very nearly) and thus fails to take 
into account the nature of music/musicality and its social correlates in a variety of non-Western contexts. 
Some music researchers are acutely aware of this, and keen to point out the problem, and we are deeply 
sympathetic. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue. 
8 
scientists represent them, their ‘level of description’.4 Atoms combine to form molecules 
which themselves form biological entities like proteins, and so on. A psychologist might 
be interested in positing mental models to explain human musical behaviour and 
cognition, while a cognitive neuroscientist would posit mechanisms in neural anatomy 
to ground both those models and (by extension) those same behaviours. The research 
agendas of cognitive science have typically focused on fairly low levels of organization, 
such as neural and psychological targets. Proponents of a growing unrest about the 
limits of this focus urge researchers to take socio-cultural matters into consideration 
(Bender et al., 2010; Cross, 2012a; Stevens, 2012; Trehub et al., 2015), thus widening 
focus to include higher levels of organization. Moreover, theoretic musical properties, 
such as key, pitch, mode and meter (and non-Western analogues), can play an important 
role in the construction of theories and studies in less abstract sciences. 
This picture immediately recalls reductionist models of science, most vividly the 
‘layer-cake’ model (Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958). However, in presenting this picture 
we do not commit to a reductionist view. First, dividing research questions by level of 
organization (or description) doesn’t commit to there being reductive relationships 
between those levels (see, for instance Potochnik, 2010; Wimsatt, 1994; Fodor, 1974; 
Darden and Maull, 1977). Second, as we have stated, our purpose here is to illustrate the 
wide variety of perspectives from which music can be studied, and this is a helpful way 
of doing so. Helpful, but deeply flawed. Most strikingly problematic is our placement of 
highly abstract investigations such as analytic music theory at the highest level of 
organization—this hardly makes sense! Human social groups do not together form the 
mathematical structures of musical theory! This would be problematic if our aim was to 
                                                          
4  See Craver (2005, 2007) for discussions of both different conceptions of ‘levels’ and integration in 
cognitive neuroscience. 
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provide a thorough characterization of the landscape of musical research. However, 
given that our purpose is to provide a preliminary sketch which motivates pluralism, we 
think this is adequate for our purposes. As we have said, that our two dimensions fail to 
capture some aspects of musical research is a feature rather than a bug: it shows that to 
capture musical research adequately more complexity is required. 
Combining the two dimensions provides a set of possible questions, or 
perspectives, from which one might embark on the project of understanding music; 
these are different research agendas. Embracing the cluster of research agendas 
represented by the combination of these two dimensions will drive our pluralism about 
music concepts. 
2.2  Lines of Evidence and Integration 
Musical science requires a broad range of evidential sources. Here we present 
some of these, before discussing integration: the relationship between such evidence 
and research agendas.  
Lines of evidence are generated by some technology or technique. A novel line of 
evidence gains relevance and garners support via background theory which (1) 
underwrites how the technology in question operates, and (2) links it to some 
hypothesis.  
Lines of evidence utilised by music researchers include—but are by no means 
limited to—brain scans, behavioural responses (from various stages of development), 
archaeological finds, cross-cultural ethnography, cross-species comparison, data on 
happiness/wellbeing, psychiatry, physiology and genetics. Often these lines of evidence 
are best harnessed by representatives of distinct disciplines—psychology, neuroscience, 
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archaeology, anthropology, biology, to name a few. Musical science is a truly 
interdisciplinary game. 
In short, there is a wide range of research agendas guiding us, and a plurality of 
available empirical resources. Understanding the relationships between these different 
questions and evidence is important for the field’s progress (cf. Fitch, 2015). 
Brigandt (2010) and Love (2006) have discussed the relationship between 
different research agendas and evidence in reference to evolutionary developmental 
theory and functional morphology, respectively (see also Potochnik, 2010). By their 
picture, different sources of evidence play different roles depending on which research 
agenda is salient. For some contexts, a particular agenda, and thus some evidence, 
carries the explanatory force, while other evidence plays a supporting role. We can 
determine explanatory force (at least as a rough ‘first pass’) by considering the 
pragmatics of explanation. We can ask which agenda provides the relevant answer to a 
question, and which agendas play supporting roles—that is, provide reasons to believe 
that answer. Let us explain. 
Consider Grahn’s (2012) discussion of interval and entrainment models. She 
asks, which psychological features allow humans to recognise rhythm? The two kinds of 
models posit different mechanisms to explain human rhythm recognition. An interval 
model contrasts the beat of a fixed internal clock (or clocks) to an external rhythm, 
while entrainment models fit an internal oscillator to external stimuli (see Grondin, 
2010; McAuley, 2010). As Grahn points out, it is not obvious that models of time 
intervals are fine-grained enough to handle rhythms (which are sequences of time 
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intervals), but it is a useful starting point at any rate. In her paper, Grahn focuses on 
how neuroscientific data might decide between these hypotheses.5  
We can understand Grahn’s research agenda in terms of ‘explanatory force’. 
Specifically, it seems to us that the psychological perspective—one which posits mental 
models—is doing the explanatory work. That is, the question ‘how do humans recognise 
rhythm?’ is answered by claiming that either interval models, or entrainment models, or 
perhaps some other psychological model, if instantiated in human psychology, would 
allow for that capacity. Neuroscience plays a supporting role in this context by helping 
theorists distinguish between psychological hypotheses. Clearly, for any psychological 
model to be veridical, it must at least be possible for it to be instantiated in the human 
brain. If the model cannot be realized, it cannot plausibly capture that aspect of human 
psychology. This is a relationship between a lower level of organization (about neural 
correlates) and a slightly higher level (about psychological models for music). The 
psychological models do the relevant explanatory work, and neuroscientific input 
provides additional empirical support, individuating competing models and evidentially 
discriminating hypotheses. This is an example of the kind of integration which our 
pluralism engenders, that we make explicit in the next section.6 
                                                          
5  Here, Grahn also discusses the benefits and limitations of employing neuroscientific methods in the 
study of musical rhythm in general (see also Grahn, 2009). 
6  Another example of integration across levels of organization:  Temperley (2014) asks which 
probability model best predicts available data about musical intervals? He distinguishes the Markov model 
(Rohrmeier et al., 2015; Conklin and Witten, 1995; Pearce and Wiggins, 2004, 2006) from the Gaussian model 
(von Hippel, 2000; Marr, 1982; Shi et al., 2010); the Markov model defines a musical interval’s probability ‘by 
its count in a corpus, conditioned on previous intervals’, while the Gaussian model defines it as ‘a simple 
function of the size of the interval to the previous note and the distance to the mean pitch of the melody’ 
(Temperley, 2014, p. 96). These models are tested against three data sets: sequential data from large samples 
of folksong, chorale, classical, and rock melodies, experimental data from the empirical study of melodic 
expectation, and distribution data capturing the melodic intervals comprising the Essen Folksong Collection (cf. 
Schaffrath, 1995). Again, we here see the explanatory force carried by the modelling, and the data from actual 
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We have suggested that the science of music is doubly complex. First, different 
research agendas can be conceptualised and organised along two dimensions: level of 
organization and temporal scale. Second, there is a plurality of evidence-streams which 
scientists draw on and, as we have just seen, integrate. This situation, we think, is best 
captured by the notion of a ‘research cluster’ (Wylie, 1999; Abrahamson, 1987). 
Institutionally speaking, there is no ‘discipline’ of musical science. There is, rather, a 
cluster of disparate research agendas, theories and evidence-generating techniques 
which, in sum, provide a messy yet promising route to understanding music. Clearly, for 
such research clusters to advance, attention must be paid to how the various questions 
and properties mesh. In what follows, we argue that such pluralism runs deep: not only 
is there a plurality of research agendas targeting music, but a pluralism of music 
concepts. Moreover, adopting conceptual pluralism about music can aid us in 
integration.  
3.  What is Music? 
As we saw in §2, musical science involves a cluster of disciplines targeting 
different agendas and generating different evidence. In our view, there is no unitary, all-
purpose definition of music appropriate for these needs. It is worth briefly 
distinguishing our approach from a more traditional philosophical agenda of specifying 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for music.  
For example, Andrew Kania proposes three identity conditions:  
…music (1) is any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be 
heard, and (3) either (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as pitch 
or rhythm, or (b) to be listened to for such features (Kania, 2011, p. 12).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
musical form playing a supporting role; Temperley argues that the Markov model is to be preferred for its 
lower cross-entropy than that of the Gaussian model (see Temperley, 2014, pp. 90-92). 
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(Davies (2012a) and McKeown-Green (2014) propose counterexamples to 
Kania’s analysis.) Kania provides a sophisticated analysis intended to carve the world in 
a unitary, universal fashion: music simpliciter. In contrast, we think that various musical 
concepts are best understood as indexed to research agendas. That is, it is our 
contention that ‘music’ is not amenable to unitary analysis—at least for the purposes of 
its scientific investigation. Consider the numerous tensions that arise from different 
aspects of music, emphasized by different research agendas. Music is sometimes 
considered a product of intentional action, particularly in anthropological and (some) 
philosophical settings. Music is sometimes considered an object with particular formal 
features by, for instance, Western history or analytic theory—but in cross-cultural 
settings the lack of such features is emphasized. Music can be an expressive function of 
sociality/culture but can also be considered as a cognitive trait, or in terms of neural 
mechanisms. Music’s various features matter, more or less, for different agendas: that of 
psychology, music theory, anthropology, and so on.7  Even if a unitary account covering 
all of these uses were available, it is unclear what utility it would serve: the tensions 
between the various agendas are better resolved, where possible, via piece-meal 
integration. In short, we are pluralists—non-essentialists—about music.  
A pluralist about some category believes there is more than one legitimate and 
non-equivalent concept pertaining to that category. We can understand ‘concepts’ as 
                                                          
7  For some schematic examples of this tension, note that music that does not meet Kania’s 
‘intentional’ requirement might still realize the role of music in some socio-cultural context and thus should be 
categorised as music by the ethnomusicologist, given their research agenda, but perhaps not by the 
psychologist, given theirs. Similarly, music that does not meet a (Western) ‘basic musical features’ requirement 
might still count as music for the ethnomusicologist and psychologist, but perhaps not for the (Western) music 
theorist or aesthetician. 
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providing instructions for dividing up the world: a music concept tells us what is and 
what isn’t ‘music’, a species concept tells us what it takes for two organisms to be part of 
the same species. We illustrate this with a crude version of species pluralism. A pluralist 
about species might hold that the phenetic concept, which classifies species in terms of 
(usually morphological) similarity, and the biological concept, which classifies them in 
terms of potential interbreeding, are both legitimate (see Ereshefsky, 1998, 2010; 
Kitcher, 1984). Paleobiologists interested in broad macro-level patterns might use the 
phenetic conception, for instance, while evolutionary biologists interested in 
contemporary lineages may use the biological conception. The justification for pluralism 
turns on, first, the lack of a unifying concept which meets the needs of various scientists, 
and second, the equal legitimacy of those scientific concerns. 
We take the discussion in §2, in part, to provide inductive evidence that there is 
no unifying music concept. Indeed, as we discuss in more detail below, different 
scientists rely on different (but complementary) ‘operationalised’ music concepts. As we 
shall argue, these are non-equivalent and are tailored to particular agendas. Moreover, 
these agendas (and thus their concepts) seem to us equally legitimate—why should the 
anthropologist receive short shrift in favour of the neuroscientist, or vice-versa? This is 
not to say that different music concepts are unrelated or independent. Indeed, pluralism 
encourages integration. 
Although we embrace a plurality of music-concepts, the result is not a chaotic 
free-for-all. First, the appropriateness and applicability of the concepts are set by the 
relevant research agenda (cf. Kitcher, 1984 in regards to species pluralism). Second, 
while some concepts are complementary, others are antagonistic, representing real 
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empirical disagreement8. In what follows, we describe and illustrate complementary 
and antagonistic relations between music-concepts. This distinction, in part, drives our 
pluralism.  
Concepts targeting different aspects of music, or music in conjunction with 
additional elements (e.g., dance or words/poetry), or in different cultures or eras can be 
complementary. Work from complementary concepts furthers our scientific 
understanding of music; different definitions can be appropriate for different research 
agendas, so we need not decide between them as definitions of music simpliciter. Of 
course, definitions can be better or worse suited to the agenda at hand—and sometimes 
determining this requires empirical work. So long as the definitions are complementary, 
we recommend a pluralistic position on music-concepts; we need not privilege any 
particular one. 
An example of complementary definitions can be found in Ian Cross’ three-tiered 
account of music (Cross, 2012a), in turn drawing on the seminal work of 
ethnomusicologist Alan Merriam (1963, 1964). The first is ‘concept’: music in its 
contingent, socially constructed guise, indexed to a particular tradition, time, and place. 
The second, ‘behaviour’, is the set of human behaviours out of which cultural practice 
arises. Groups might share musical ‘behaviour’: for instance they might both 
spontaneously respond to rhythms with body movements. However, they might differ 
on musical ‘concepts’: in one culture music could perform a strictly ritual function, while 
in another it could be restricted to entertainment. Third is ‘sound’, the ‘acoustical 
                                                          
8  Consider the interdisciplinary dissonance which comes to the fore in debates over musical versus 
linguistic syntax (see e.g. Patel, 2012a, b versus London, 2012; also Slevc et al., 2009 on ‘making 
psycholinguistics musical’), notions of musical ‘meaning’ (Koelsch, 2011; Cross, 2008; Davies, 1994), and so on. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this. 
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manifestation of musical practices’ (Cross, 2012a, p. 672). Here, we may be interested in 
the various timbres, musical scales, and so on, and how these vary across groups. In 
short, Cross’ distinctions cover different levels of organization. These concepts are 
complementary: any could be the focus of a research agenda, and such studies need not 
conflict.  
Much work in ethnomusicology and anthropology has elucidated the cross-
cultural variability both of music itself and how music is conceived (not to mention the 
diversity of musics within cultures, see Rzeszutek et al., 2012). While in the West music 
might be characterised in terms of melody, harmony, meter, and so on, as 
ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl notes, ‘there are societies and musics where these 
criteria make no sense at all’ (Nettl, 2005, p. 18). This shows there is no prima facie 
reason to think that music can be cashed out in universal terms, that is, with necessary 
and sufficient identity conditions, or that particular ‘salient features’ (see Hamilton, 
2007) of music can fulfil the needs of various scientists. This all suggests that there is no 
single, objective sense of music, independent of a research agenda. Furthermore, the 
Cross-Merriam tripartite account could obviously complement (or be complemented 
by) definitions cooked up by other theorists (a definition specific to neural-correlates 
comes to mind). 
Another example emerges from the Journal of New Music Research’s recent 
interdisciplinary issue ‘espousing different but complementary views on musical 
rhythm’ (Bello et al., 2015, p. 1). Here, cognitive scientific (Schaal et al., 2015), musical 
performance (Sethares and Toussaint, 2015), ethnomusicological (Holzapfel, 2015), 
music informational retrieval (Esparza et al., 2015), and signal-processing (Sephus et 
al., 2015) perspectives on the study of musical rhythm are presented. Let’s compare two 
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definitions of musical rhythm. Schaal and colleagues, for example, define musical 
rhythm as the ‘temporal organization of the musical material classified by the onset and 
duration of stimuli and the intervals between the onsets’ (Schaal et al., 2015, p. 3). Note 
that the cognitive scientists’ account of ‘rhythm’ is well-suited to their agenda. If rhythm 
is understood as the combination of the duration of sound, and the durations of the gaps 
between sounds, then it may be measured and is a good target for the quantified 
experimental work of that field. In contrast, Holzapfel distinguishes ‘rhythm as a 
phenomenon inherent in music [from] meter as a mental construct that helps listeners 
to organize and memorize the temporal structure of music’ (Holzapfel, 2015, p. 25). 
Ethnomusicologists are interested in musical expression across culture, and so dividing 
‘rhythm’ from ‘meter’ allows them to target the relevant cultural aspect. These distinct 
disciplines target different concepts, but each identifies an aspect of ‘rhythm’ for 
legitimate investigation. The concepts are complementary, and thus also targets of 
integration. 
Of course, pluralists do not hold that every definition of music is acceptable. 
Sometimes, difference in definition belies empirical disagreement: we call these cases 
antagonistic. Here, researchers’ understanding of what music is—or what some aspect 
of music is—are at cross purposes. They cannot both be true. 
For instance, Honing and Ploeger (2012) distinguish between musicality and 
music: 
We define musicality as a natural, spontaneously developing trait based on and 
constrained by our cognitive system, and music as a social and cultural construct 
based on that very musicality. (Honing and Ploeger, 2012, p. 516; emphasis 
ours.) 
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This distinction allows the authors to focus on the evolution of musicality, while 
black-boxing the complexities of social and cultural aspects (see §4 for caution). 
Musicality is said to develop spontaneously, which presumably is meant to separate it 
from contingent development due to cultural influence. This definition of musicality 
stands in an antagonistic relationship to others. For instance, Cross (2012a) also 
distinguishes between music and musicality, but in a strikingly different way: 
Cognitive science has dealt with music as though it consists of complexly 
patterned sounds engaged with through listening for their emotional or 
hedonic value, and with musicality as though it constitutes an autonomous 
domain of human thought and behaviour. Musicality seems to be 
interpreted as arising in two forms, one being the domain of the expert 
musician whose musicality is acquired partly through native talent and 
partly through extensive formal training, and who is responsible for 
producing music, while the other is broadly spread throughout the 
population, is manifested in the capacity to make sense of, and to be 
moved by, the complex auditory patterns that constitute music, and is 
acquired through processes of enculturation. (Cross, 2012a, p. 669; 
emphasis ours.) 
  
Note that there is no appeal to social and cultural construction in Cross’ 
characterisation of cognitive science’s treatment of music—although he does appeal to 
such factors himself when discussing music in the context of Western musicology (see 
Cross, 2012a, p. 670)—and conversely there is no appeal to cognitive traits, beyond that 
of the broad notion of ‘talent’, in his notion of musicality. 
The relationship between these definitions is antagonistic: their differences 
reflect distinct and conflicting theoretical and empirical commitments.9 Cognitive 
scientists distinguish between music and musicality in order to isolate aspects of the 
                                                          
9  Note that Cross does call for a mere terminological revision; he argues that cognitive science should 
be more sympathetic to accommodating music in non-Western cultures to reach a more comprehensive 
understanding of human musical faculties. We concur (also, see Stevens, 2012); theorists should be wary of 
reducing ‘music’ to ‘Western music’. 
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phenomenon for explanation—but in doing so, claims are made about the causal 
structures in question. Honing and Ploeger’s division between the culturally and 
biologically determined aspects of music takes it for granted that explanation of these 
features can be decoupled; Cross’ demand that cultural variability be included assumes 
that this variability matters for the agenda of cognitive science. 
How we conceptualise the division between music and musicality matters. 
Consider whether any natural sounds count as music. For instance, are non-human 
animal sounds such as birdsong, whale song, gibbon song, coyote calls, cicada chirps, 
frog croakings and great ape percussive displays, ‘music’? As far as there is any 
consensus in the philosophical literature, for example, it seems to point to the negative 
(for discussion, see Davies, 2012b). Musicologists, cognitive scientists, and 
anthropologists, too, have characterised music as an exclusively humanly-produced 
phenomenon (e.g. Godt, 2005; McDermott, 2008; Trainor, 2015; Rebuschat et al., 2012; 
Blacking, 1973). Not everyone agrees, of course; the musician David Rothenberg (e.g. 
2008) conceives of non-human animal song as music. In any case, if ‘music’ is 
operationally defined as a cultural and social construct based on musicality to the extent 
that it is unique to humans, further research can go on in disciplines such as 
anthropology, ethnomusicology, psychology and philosophy to explicate the 
implications of such an understanding, within and across the world’s cultures. However, 
studying non-human animal displays may reveal crucial details relevant to human 
musicality from a comparative perspective, whether the details are mechanistic, 
developmental, phylogenetic, or functional (Tinbergen, 1963). Even if music, thusly 
defined, is distinctly human, it doesn’t follow that the traits which underlie music are 
not shared with other critters. And this means that for some musical research 
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agendas—most obviously, those that try to understand musical evolution and 
development—a comparative perspective could be important.10 The concepts 
researchers work with will reflect this.  
In sum, then, we think there are good grounds for pluralism about music 
concepts. That is to say that there is no single, privileged concept of music, but rather a 
group of concepts more or less suited to various research agendas. This position is 
supported both by the plurality of research questions discussed in §2 and the examples 
provided in this section. We introduced two ways that music concepts can relate: they 
can be complementary or antagonistic. Complementary concepts are appropriate for 
different research agendas, while antagonistic concepts clash, and should be resolved. 
We suggested that the concepts of ‘musicality’ in Honing and Ploeger’s and in Cross’ 
work are antagonistic. 
Here are the three features which we think guide pluralistic research clusters, as 
we argue music is. 
(1) Concepts are relative to research agenda. The applicability of a concept 
depends upon what question (at what level of organization and temporal 
scale) the scientists in question are asking. There is no ‘one size fits all’ music 
concept. 
(2) Concepts are antagonistic or complementary. Some concepts reflect different 
agendas, and thus may be more-or-less integrated, where others are 
                                                          
10  For example, studies have reported interesting findings regarding the cultural evolution of non-
human animal song (Noad et al., 2000; Payne and Payne, 1993; Payne et al., 1988; Hoeschele et al., 2015; 
Merchant et al., 2015). 
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antagonistic: they underlie actual empirical disagreement which ought to be 
resolved. 
(3) Different lines of evidence, and complementary concepts, can often be 
integrated. Progress in our understanding of music requires that we 
understand and harness the relationships between these different 
perspectives. 
We think the perspective outlined above has important implications for the 
scientific investigation of music, and in the next two sections we demonstrate this. First, 
we look at attempts to explain the evolution of music; second, we turn to music’s 
psychological development. We will, albeit tentatively, put our money where our 
mouths are: our claims about pluralism are supported by demonstrating how that 
perspective feeds into empirical debate. 
4.  Music and Evolution 
Theories about the nature of systems which have evolved are constrained by 
their history, by the plausibility of hypotheses about their evolution. Conversely, any 
evolutionary explanation of some system relies upon facts about the system’s present-
day properties. In this section we argue that attending to the connections between 
research agendas suggests that some contemporary approaches to the evolution of 
music are misconceived. If music has evolved through gene-culture co-evolution—the 
dynamic interplay between biological and cultural evolution—artificially decoupling the 
biological and the cultural could be problematic. Here, the relationship between 
agendas at different temporal scales shows how antagonistic concepts might be 
resolved. 
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There is already an extensive literature on whether music has a proper function 
in evolutionary terms; that is, whether or not it evolved due to its fitness benefits in past 
environments (e.g., Cross, 2008, 2007; Davies, 2012b, Dissanayake, 1982, 2008; Fitch, 
2005; Huron, 2001, 1999; Miller, 2001, 2000; Mithen, 2005; Morley, 2013; Wallin et al., 
2000). In fact, this line of inquiry stretches back at least as far as Darwin’s 1871 The 
Descent of Man. The plausibility of claims about music’s evolutionary function turns on 
which music-concept is employed. As mentioned above, Honing and Ploeger contrast 
music, the fully-fledged behavioural, social and psychological trait, with musicality, 
roughly whatever cognitive and neural machinery underlie the culturally-influenced 
expression of music. Conceived thusly, the suggestion that music is an adaptation is a 
significantly different thesis than the claim that musicality is. 
It is helpful to contrast Honing and Ploeger’s approach with that of Pearce and 
Wiggins (2012), who present a computational model of auditory expectation explicitly 
constrained by evolution. Instead of considering musical cognitive traits (Honing and 
Ploeger’s focus), they consider music as embedded in, or perhaps emerging from, 
general cognitive processes. They make two points about such processes: (1) 
expectation should be reasonably accurate (as like any sensory cognition, getting it right 
can be the difference between finding food, being eaten, or mating); and (2) the process 
should be reasonably plastic: ‘in complex, changing auditory environments organisms 
that adapt their expectations to experience are favoured’ (Pearce and Wiggins, 2012, p. 
627). For Pearce and Wiggins, these considerations suggest that ‘innate, general-
purpose learning mechanisms [impose] architectural, not representational, constraints 
on cognitive development’ (Pearce and Wiggins, 2012, p. 627). 
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Both parties agree there is some important distinction between music and 
musicality—after all, the distinction is necessary for investigating whether music is an 
adaptation. However, they have antagonistic ideas about where to draw the line. 
Although we have sympathy for Pearce and Wiggins, this foregrounds a deeper issue.  
Debate about the proper function of music typically centres on whether some 
music-concept is best thought of as an adaptation, an exaptation, a spandrel, or a 
technology (that is, a cultural invention). There is no shortage of adaptationist 
hypotheses. For instance, Miller (2001, 2000) argues that music is an adaptation via 
sexual selection. Brown (2000) argues that music is a group-level adaptation. 
Dissanayake (e.g., 1982) argues that the arts (we may include music here) impart 
‘specialness’ and enhance ritual, reinforcing social cohesion. Cross (2007) suggests that 
music enabled the integration (‘bridging the gap’) of domain-specific neural substrates 
(modules), giving rise to domain-general competency; Cross (2012b, 2012c) suggests 
that music functioned as an interactive situation-management medium in moments of 
social uncertainty. Dunbar (1996, 1993) argues that vocal grooming emerged once 
hominid group size increased and physical grooming became unsuitable. Several 
theorists (e.g., Trehub, 2003; Trehub and Trainor, 1998) propose that music’s origins 
are in mother-infant relations: lullaby and play song that produce changes in infant 
affect and arousal and strengthen mother-infant bonds. 
Other theorists are sceptical about music having an evolutionary function. Pinker 
(1997) argues that music emerged as a by-product of other established cognitive 
faculties (see also e.g., Barrow, 2005; Panksepp, 2009; Sperber, 1996). Livingstone and 
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Thompson (2009) argue that music emerged as a by-product of theory of mind.11 Davies 
(2012b) argues that even if music is a by-product, it would have eventually taken on 
adaptive functionality (that is, become an ‘exaptation’). Finally, music has been 
described as a transformative technology, somewhat akin to the discovery and 
production of fire (Patel, 2010). 
As it stands, this debate requires the music/musicality distinction, as we must 
distinguish between those aspects of music which are plausible targets of evolution by 
natural selection (say, the cognitive processes which underlie musicality if Pearce and 
Wiggins are right) from those which are more problematic (say, the specific expression 
of a musical style). If that distinction separates the biological and cultural aspects of 
music, their co-evolution could undermine it (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Feldman and 
Cavalli-Sforza, 1976; Feldman and Laland, 1996). Traditionally, evolutionary 
explanation envisions a relatively static environment to which a phenotype is shaped. 
However, biological and cultural features can create positive feedback. Such dynamic 
relationships seem likely for music: there is much cultural variation, music has diverse 
roles in different societies; yet music is ubiquitous and seems to follow a fairly 
structured developmental sequence (Hannon and Trainor, 2007; Schellenberg and 
Trainor, 1996; Schellenberg and Trehub, 1996a, b; Stalinski and Schellenberg, 2012; 
Trainor, 2005; Trainor and Corrigall, 2010). This supports the view that the biological 
                                                          
11  To be sure, ‘theory of mind’ approaches are compatible with other models and hypotheses too, 
including the co-evolutionary approach that we endorse in the discussion that follows. The uses and 
implications of theory of mind research is another example of the pluralistic research strategy that we endorse 
in our paper.    
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and cultural aspects of music are causally intertwined, evolutionarily speaking: both 
have shaped each other.12  
Acknowledging the strong likelihood that music has evolved dynamically (see 
e.g. Brown et al., 2013) strikes us as foregrounding at least two implications. First, 
complex co-evolution makes evolutionary explanations couched in terms of adaptation, 
exaptation, spandrel, and technology much more complex. To an extent, this four-way 
distinction assumes causal simplicity, a one-way causal arrow, ‘environment → 
phenotype’, that ignores the implications of a co-evolutionary model. Consequently, one 
might call into question the usefulness of these distinctions (cf. Killin, 2013). Of course, 
such co-evolution does not mean that music cannot have an adaptationist explanation. 
The social/technological invention of cooking, for instance, seems to have spurred 
evolution in a swathe of our ancestor’s physiological traits (tooth size reduction, 
changes in digestion mechanisms, etc… see Wrangham & Conklin-Brittain 2003). It is 
reasonable to say that our reduced tooth size is an adaptation to novel cooking 
environments. However, note that the environment is dynamic, and that the coupling of 
cooking and tooth-size is a relatively simple case. Given the sheer complexity of music 
and musical behaviour, it strikes us that the explanation of music will not be anywhere 
near so straightforward. The point is not that we cannot give an evolutionary account of 
music, or that (perhaps) it is ultimately illegitimate to draw distinctions along the lines 
of ‘music/musicality’. The point is that we cannot black-box one or the other in our 
                                                          
12  The idea that the biological and cultural aspects of music are correlated and interact is reasonably 
uncontroversial (cf. Hambrick and Tucker-Drob, 2014), however this has not been adequately reflected in most 
theories of music evolution (though see Tomlinson, 2015). 
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explanations. Holistic explanatory models, which combine the ‘biological’ and ‘social’ 
aspects of music and attend to their complex interaction are called for.13 
Second, theories of cultural evolution and niche construction ought to play a 
more prominent role in explaining music (following e.g. Merker et al., 2015; Rzeszutek 
et al., 2012; Tëmkin and Eldredge, 2007; Menary, 2014; Trainor, 2015), and competing 
theories of music’s cultural evolution should be individuated and tested. After all, 
culture-specific exposure to music seems to influence the development of musical 
cognitive capacities (Gerry et al., 2010; Hannon and Trehub, 2005a, b; Schellenberg and 
Trehub, 1999; Soley and Hannon, 2010; Stalinski and Schellenberg, 2012; Trehub, 
2003). In our view, these two implications suggest we should shift from traditional 
evolutionary psychological methods (e.g. Barkow et al., 1992) that have, to some extent, 
informed prior evolutionary theorising about music (especially that of music’s 
purported status as an adaptation or otherwise; e.g. Honing and Ploeger, 2012). 
In this section, we have bought a pluralistic conception to bear on the evolution 
of music. We contrasted Honing and Ploeger’s conception of the divide between ‘music’ 
and ‘musicality’ with Pearce and Wiggins’, suggesting that the relationship is 
antagonistic and in need of empirical investigation. We further argued that co-
evolutionary models may undermine some distinctions in the context of evolutionary 
explanation.14 If indeed the biological and cultural aspects of music co-evolved in a tight 
lock-step, then dividing them may be a mistake. Whether our suspicions bear fruit 
                                                          
13  We are not necessarily committing to scientific or theory-holism. Rather, we mean a model which 
incorporates both evidence-streams and complementary definitions from different disciplines. Worries about 
testing holistic models are not pressing in such cases. In fact, extra streams of evidence can improve our 
capacity to test such models. 
14  We do not deny that such music/musicality distinctions may have important roles in, for instance, 
anthropological investigation of cross-cultural universals, and so on. 
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depends on further investigation; our aim has been to illustrate the utility of a 
pluralistic conception of music. 
5.  Nature versus Nurture 
The nature versus nurture debate remains a pressing concern for many music 
scholars. In this section we illustrate how questions of music’s innateness or otherwise 
are reconceived in light of pluralism. We recommend the construction of integrated, 
hybrid models which incorporate both learned and innate aspects in explaining the 
development of musical psychology, and provide a short example of how this may be 
done. 
5.1 Is Music Innate? 
One key debate in the cognitive science of music (at least since Blacking 1973) 
concerns the source of musicality’s development. The two dominant contemporary 
hypotheses privilege either innate psychoacoustic principles, or models of exposure-
based learning (see Loui, 2012). That is, on the one hand infants come with in-built 
‘rules’ upon which musicality develops, while on the other the infant learns these rules 
via interaction with other humans and her environment.15 
Marcus (2012) distinguishes innateness from the so-called ‘music instinct’, 
separating two research agendas which, on Marcus’ view, are often conflated. First, we 
can ask whether music is innate, examining cases for an inborn human endowment for 
                                                          
15  One example of this debate targets beat perception. Some (e.g. Winkler et al., 2009) favour an innate 
model based on the early development of this perception in infants. However, others (e.g. Grahn, 2012) point 
out that this is too quick: much learning occurs in pre-natal stages. For instance, empirical studies demonstrate 
that ‘infants exposed to particular pieces of music before birth show distinct preferences for those same 
pieces after birth’ (Sloboda, 2005, p. 267; see also Hepper, 1991 and Parncutt, 2009 for more on prenatal and 
infant musical conditioning). 
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music. Second, we can ask whether the suite of cognitive apparatus underlying human 
musical faculties is domain-specific (cf. Trainor, 2015). These questions are at distinct 
temporal scales. One is about how musical cognition develops, the other about music’s 
cognitive architecture. Presumably, as Marcus illustrates, the cognitive apparatus 
enabling chess performance in grandmasters is (at least in part) specific to chess, but it 
is unlikely there is much support for a ‘chess instinct’; chess skills are learned rather 
than innate.16 Perhaps music is also learned yet (at least in part) specific, and Marcus 
explores this possibility, raising a further series of research questions; in doing so, he 
nicely illustrates a point which we think should be obvious. The question is not whether 
music is innate, or domain-specific, but whether music qua- some research agenda is. 
The tricky part is determining where to draw the lines: discovering which conceptions 
of music are most amenable to the agenda at hand. 
Theorists are divided about music’s innateness (Rebuschat et al., 2012); some 
(e.g., Loui, 2012; Marcus, 2012; Stalinski and Schellenberg, 2012) prefer the explanation 
that music is more learned than innate, but to different extents. Towards the other end 
of the continuum, Pearce and Wiggins argue that at least some cognitive aspects of 
music are not learned, emphasising the ‘cognitive process of expectation… in music 
cognition’ (Pearce and Wiggins, 2012, p. 626) and highlighting its potential adaptive 
benefit. Further still, Honing and Ploeger argue that numerous aspects of music are 
innate, for example, that beat perception is ‘an innate bias, rather than… a result of 
learning’ (Honing and Ploeger, 2012, p. 518).  
                                                          
16  An anonymous referee highlights a disanalogy between the acquisition of chess skills and culturally-
appropriate music appreciation: the former is effortful while the latter is a much simpler task.  
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What, then, is the answer to the more general question: is music primarily innate 
or learned? The way forward is to develop hybrid models which elucidate the 
relationship between learned and innate aspects. A hybrid model integrates several 
complementary concepts. We illustrate this with a side-step into discussion of 
comparative research. 
5.2 Entrainment in Vocal Mimics 
Consider two traits: vocal mimicry and entrainment. Vocal learning species, or 
vocal mimics, are those species capable of vocal mimicry of heard, external sounds: the 
capacity is seen in various birds, cetaceans (dolphins and whales), pinnipeds (seals and 
sea lions), and humans (see Patel, 2006). Entrainment is bodily movement/gesture that 
corresponds with an external rhythmic beat.17 Infamous non-human examples include 
the entrainment to recorded pop music of the sulphur-crested cockatoo Snowball and 
the African grey parrot Alex (see Fitch, 2009; Schachner, 2013). An extensive YouTube 
search, exploiting a novel database, provided evidence of entrainment in 33 vocal 
mimics, and zero non vocal mimics (Schachner, 2013).  
No evidence of entrainment has been found in non vocal learning species, and 
entrainment has never been witnessed in the wild even among vocal mimics (indicating 
that it has no adaptive fitness). This suggests that entrainment is a by-product of the 
faculty of vocal mimicry; entrainment does not require any genetic change to the suite 
of cognitive capacities possessed by the vocal mimic. As our common ancestor with 
these vocal mimics is truly ancient, this phenomenon is surely a case of convergent 
evolution. Great apes do not display this trait. Thus cognition of vocal mimicry and 
                                                          
17  More precisely, entrainment is the ‘coming together’ or synchronicity of multiple interacting, though 
independent, rhythmic oscillators or processes.  
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entrainment in the animal kingdom is ripe for research and could provide useful 
analogies for human musical cognition (see Currie, 2013 for a discussion of the role of 
convergences generally). 
So, by identifying and comparing vocal mimicry and entrainment, we can 
uncover a dependency relationship between them, and gain insight into their 
development. Briefly, it seems that the apparatus required for vocal mimicry are easily 
co-opted for entrainment. Presumably, this counts against entrainment being strongly 
innate. This prediction is testable and research has begun (see Schachner, 2013). 
Entrainment research tends to collect behavioural data. To our knowledge, few 
attempts have been made at collecting neural data related to this topic (though see e.g. 
Honing et al., 2012; Merchant et al., 2015); this strikes us as one interesting area to 
develop new research agendas (for review see Hoeschele et al., 2015). For instance, to 
what extent is the capacity to mimic heard sounds innate? What about the capacity to 
entrain to a beat/pulse? Are these capacities domain-specific to musicality? If vocal 
mimicry provided organisms with the cognitive apparatus for entrainment and beat 
perception, and entrainment is a by-product of vocal learning, then hypotheses may be 
developed about the innateness of one musical aspect but not another. At the very least, 
comparative-method theorising foregrounds tentative ways forward (see e.g. Merker, 
2012). Indeed, theorists can narrow down potential non-human analogies for musicality 
(of some relevant kind) since the behaviours in question rely on distinct cognitive 
apparatus (Fitch, 2005). 
By constructing a hybrid model which integrates both the (presumably 
somewhat innate) capacity for vocal mimicry with the (presumably more learned) 
capacity for entrainment, a better understanding of both is achieved. Moreover, new 
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avenues of investigation open. Obviously, achieving the same for innateness of musical 
traits in humans in a broader sense would be a very complex task, but we hope the 
methodological lesson is clear. 
6.  Conclusions 
We have tackled both a philosophical task and a scientific one. The philosophical 
task was to argue that we ought to be pluralists about music-concepts. Support was 
drawn from our description of the scientific study of music generally, and the two case 
studies. The scientific task was to show that the philosophical perspective we 
recommend makes a difference to scientific practice. This was demonstrated by the 
speculative but (we think) fruitful suggestions made in regards to the case studies. 
To understand music in a scientific context, researchers must weave together 
evolutionary, developmental, behavioural, psychological, cultural and analytic threads, 
amongst others, into an integrated patchwork. The science of music is indeed an 
interdisciplinary project. Our methodological recommendation is to divide and then 
integrate. Difficult questions (e.g. ‘is music innate?’) are decomposed into simpler 
targets which can be answered by different lines of evidence, and then synthesised into 
more holistic and multidisciplinary models. Our discussion has been both schematic and 
restricted to two specific, though hotly contested, issues. However, many doors have 
been opened for further enquiry. Which music-concepts are employed, and by theorists 
of which disciplines? Which music-concepts are complementary and which are 
antagonistic? How can perspectives from the humanities be integrated with quantified, 
scientific research? Which evidence-streams bear on which research agendas? There is 
much more work to be done and the prospect is both challenging and invigorating. 
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